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Meltzer on Welfare and
Pension Legislation
Senator John Kennedy, Chairman of the Senate Sub­
committee on Welfare and Pension legislation, re­
quested Professor Bernard D. Meltzer, of the Law
School, to comment on various bills for the regulation
of welfare and pension plans. Professor Meltzer, after
his written comments were received, was invited to
testify at the hearings on the pending bills. After his
testimony on July 1, 1957, Professor Meltzer prepared
a supplemental memorandum for the sub-committee.
Because of the widespread interest in the legislation
involved, Professor Meltzer's memorandum is (except
for the introductory paragraph) reproduced below,
following a summary of his oral testimony.
In his testimony, Professor Meltzer emphasized the
need for avoiding legislation which would produce
an unmanageable l1WSS of reports, but at the same
time he questioned the basis for the various exemp­
tions from comprehensive disclosure regulation em­
bodied in the various bills. He pointed also to the
practical and legal obstacles to the enforcement of
fiduciary obligations by private litigation, and he
urged that federal legislation should go beyond dis­
closure requirements and should prohibit transactions
incompatible with fiduciary standards. He suggested
that the penal provisions of the pending bills which
sought to do this were unduly vague and indicated
how they could be made more specific. He recom­
mended also that penal provisions should be supple­
mented by provisions authorizing civil suits in the
federal courts on the part of both the enjorcement
agency and the aggrieved beneficiaries. Finally, he
presented the reasons for making the Securities and
Exchange Commission, rather than the Secretary of
Labor, the enforcement agency.
In his supplemental memorandum Professor Meltzer
stated:
My testimony on July 1 emphasized both the sub­
stantial administrative difficulties involved in general
disclosure regulations and the reasons for doubting
the effectiveness of such regulation unless it was
supplemented by provisions incorporating and imple­
menting fiduciary standards. I did not, however,
explicitly challenge the desirability of comprehensive
disclosure on the motion of non-exempt plans, as part
of a total regulatory program.
I feel it appropriate to supplement my testimony
because further consideration has persuaded me that
such automatic disclosure is probably not necessary
for effective regulation and that legislation which
concentrated on the definition and enforcement of
fiduciary standards would be a preferable alternative.
Such an alternative program would contain the
following elements, which are developed more fully
below:
( 1) Prohibitions against specified violations of fiduciary
standards, implemented by both criminal sanctions and civil
actions in the federal courts;
(2) Provisions requiring adequate and accurate disclosure to
beneficiaries, implemented by criminal sanctions and injunctive
relief at the request of the enforcing agency;
( 3) Provisions authorizing the enforcing agency
(a) by regulation to prescribe record-keeping require­
ments for health and welfare plans;
(b) by regulation, subject to veto by either House of
Congress, to prohibit additional classes of transac­
tions deemed incompatible with fiduciary standards;
(c) to call for comprehensive reports from, to subpoena
and/or to inspect the books and records of, or per­
taining to, particular welfare and pension plans se­
lected by the agency.
The foregoing proposals would, I believe, have the
following advantages over the general and automatic
disclosure provisions which are a central feature of
pending bills:
( 1) They would avoid the logical and political difficulties
raised by exemptions which are deemed necessary to keep the
enforcement job manageable, but which are highly contro­
versial.
(2) They would more directly and effectively attack the
central problem of misconduct by fiduciaries.
( 3) They would involve less cost to the government and to
properly managed plans, which presumably represent the over­
whelming majority of all plans of any type.
Before I examine the merits of general disclosure
regulation and the alternative pro g r a m outlined
above, it is appropriate that I make explicit my
assumptions concerning the primary purposes of the
contemplated legislation. I assume these purposes to
be: (1) the deterrence of misconduct, i.e., malfea­
sance, by fiduciaries; (2) provision for adequate and
accurate disclosure to beneficiaries; and (3) the en­
forcement of appropriate criminal and civil sanctions
against delinquent fiduciaries. I assume, moreover,
that the pending bills are not designed to insure wise,
as distinguished from honest, administration. They
are, for example, not directed at achieving actuarial
soundness in pension plans or wise investment policies.
I consider this limitation of the legislative purpose
desirable, and I will not extend this memorandum by
examining the many problems involved.
I exclude also from the legislative purposes the
collection of comprehensive data concerning the
general impact of welfare and pension plans on em­
ployee-employer relationships or on our economic life
generally. This is not to deny that such data might
be interesting and useful and might have implications
for public policy. Nevertheless, the data necessary
for such purposes can be collected by means which
are much less costly than. dis clos ure regulation.
Furthermore, the collection of such data generally
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proves more useful if it is prompted by specific prob­
lems rather than by the vague hope that the informa­
tion will come in handy. Finally, any attempt to use
disclosure regulation for the collection of comprehen­
sive data would clash with the objective of using
such regulation for the purpose of promoting proper
conduct by fiduciaries. This is true because the polic­
ing of fiduciaries, if the administrative burden is to
be kept manageable, requires the narrowing of cover­
age so as to exempt plans in which danger of abuse
is negligible, whereas the accumulation of complete
data demands comprehensive coverage. For these
reasons, in the discussion which follows, disclosure
requirements and alternatives thereto will be tested
solely by their probable contribution to the observance
of fiduciary standards; any collateraL benefits arising
from the availability of comprehensive data regarding
welfare and pension plans will be disregarded.
Legislation which relies largely on general dis­
closure requirements involves two fundamental diffi­
culties. The first, which has been a principal concern
of the Committee, is the need for exemptions with
three characteristics: ( 1) They must be numerically
significant so as to avoid either enormous administra­
tive costs or a mass of reports, most of which cannot
be carefully examined. (2) They should be based on
principles with a rational relationship to the legisla­
tive purposes, i.e., the exempted plans should be an
identifiable class in which the probability of fiduciary
abuse is low both in relation to non-exempt plans
and as an absolute matter. (3) Finally, the exemp­
tions must, of course, command the necessary political
support. The second difficulty of disclosure regulation,
which has apparently been of less concern to the
Committee, is the uncertainty as to whether such
regulation, even though appropriate exemptions are
made and an adequate enforcement staff provided,
would significantly advance the legislative purposes.
I turn now to a discussion of each of these difficulties.
As my testimony indicated, each of the exemptions
contemplated by the various bills (except the Ad­
ministration bill) involves a serious question as to
whether it is rationally related to the legislative pur­
poses. There is no need to repeat my testimony, but
I do wish to supplement my discussion of the pro­
posed exemption for level-of-benefit plans. Such plans,
according to the Committee's data, constitute by far
the largest single class of plans and are usually
administered solely by the employer. For this reason,
my comments concerning the level-of-benefit exemp­
tion are to a large extent applicable to the exemption
for employer-administered plans contemplated by
S. 1813.
Fiduciary misconduct disclosed by recent investi­
gations has been concentrated in jointly-administered
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plans which, at present, generally provide, not for a
specified level of benefits, but for a specified level of
expenditure. Despite this fact, a statutory exemption
for level-of-benefit plans seems unwarranted, for the
following reasons: First, such investigation involved
level-of-benefit plans administered by large, respected
and publicly exposed companies, such as General
Motors. The result of such investigation plainly can­
not properly be viewed as a certificate of good char­
acter for all such plans. Secondly, such plans are
susceptible to the abuses, such as split commissions,
and kickbacks, which have occurred in other kinds of
plans. And a flat statutory exemption for level-of­
benefit plans might well generate pressure by strong
and unscrupulous union officials to transform existing
or future plans so as to bring the exemption into
play. If such pressure proved successful, a statutory
exemption would on practice operate to exempt plans
and administrators quite different from those con­
templated when the exemption was embodied in the
statute.
It is true, of course, that an employer has an in­
centive to keep the cost of the level-of-benefit plans
low. But the term "employer" is an abstraction which
obscures the fact particular employees may not be
averse to feathering their personal nests. Further­
more, the "employer's" incentive operates only as to
his actual costs, as opposed to his ostensible costs. He
has no incentive, for example, to forego kickbacks and
the like so long as they go back to the enterprise. On
the contrary, he may have an incentive to arrange for
such transactions in order to inflate the ostensible
costs of the benefits. This is true because the costs
of specified benefits are in effect wages, and the total
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of such actual or ostensible costs will be a factor in
collective bargaining negotiations. High costs, actual
or ostensible, will provide arguments against re­
quested increases in the level of benefits or the level
of conventional wages. Since the ostensible costs are
wages, the employees are entitled to an adequate quid
pro quo in the form of benefits which are not diluted
by excessive commissions, kickbacks, and the like. In
connection with the employer's cost cutting incentive, .
it should also be noted that companies making cents­
per-hour contributions also have an incentive, albeit
a more indirect one, to get the most for their money
in the form of employee benefits. Benefits attract and
hold efficient employees - a not unimportant consid­
eration in a period like the present when there is
vigorous competition for such employees. Further­
more, the employer's cost-cutting incentive, even
assuming its effectiveness, does not achieve one of the
objectives of the proposed legislation, namely fair and
adequate disclosure to the employees.
Under the Nat ion a I Labor Relations Act, as
amended, an employer is, of course, obliged, when
requested by a union representing his employees, to
furnish data as to actual costs where that is relevant
to collective bargaining negotiations. But this obliga­
tion is plainly not the same as an obligation to make
periodic reports to the employees concerning the costs
and the benefits under a plan. This difference is
underscored by the increasing tendency toward longer
term collective bargaining agreements. Furthermore,
employers have apparently resisted demands for dis­
closure on the ground that their duty is discharged
when they provide the level-of-benefits contracted
for. This attitude is inconsistent both with employers'
insistence in other contexts that fringe costs are in­
distinguishable from wage costs and with the incon­
trovertible proposition that employees are entitled to
know the level of their wages. In view of the fore­
going considerations, level-of-benefit plans, even if
exempted from the duty to disclose to the govern­
ment, should not be exempted from a requirement
of adequate disclosure to the beneficiaries of the plans.
On the basic issue raised by the level of benefit
exemption, the probability of malfeasance in admin­
istration, it is, I believe, fair to say that of all con­
templated exemptions, it has the strongest claim to
support on the basis of investigations thus far. But
the investigation obviously did not consider the pos­
sibility that strong and unscrupulous elements in the
labor movement might exert effective pressure to
secure the benefits of this exemption for improper
purposes. And, as already indicated, the investigations
were limited, and the abuses they disclosed in other
plans could occur, and may have occurred, in level­
of-benefit plans. For these reasons, the exemption of
such plans from disclosure regulation rests on grounds
that are questionable.
The foregoing objections to the "level-of-benefit"
exemption have been urged by organized labor, whose
opposition may, of course, defeat any legislation. Such
opposition is, doubtlessly, reinforced by the fear that
such an exemption would involve the distasteful im­
plication that abuses result only when unions are the
sole administrators of plans or jointly participate in
their administration. As my testimony indicated, the
practical political problems resulting from such oppo­
sition are a matter on which the Committee needs no
comment from outsiders. Nevertheless, it is significant
that one consequence of such opposition may be legis­
lative proposals for disclosure regulation so compre­
hensive in their coverage that they would involve the
dilemma of either an unmanageahle mass of reports
cr a mammoth and very costly enforcement staff.
Such a dilemma would, for example, appear to be the
necessary result of the enactment of the Administra­
tion bill, which does not provide for any exemption at
all. Such possibilities reinforce more fundamental
considerations indicating that the disclosure regula­
tion contemplated may, in the context of pension and
welfare plans, be the wrong way to attack the problem
of fiduciary abuse.
Disclosure requirements alone obviously do not
prohibit improper transactions. All they do is to make
them known. Their effect as a deterrent depends in
part on the sense of shame of those who would other­
wise engage in improprieties and in part on the effec-
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supplemental Committee Reports which fill in a fe\v
of the gaps. But because the amendment, for prac­
tical considerations, had to be pushed through Con­
gress rapidly, there unfortunately are a number of
questions about it which are vexing, to say the least.
In fact, some experts have suggested that technically
there is doubt whether the legislation is adequate
to reverse the Supreme Court decision which set it in
motion. Moreover, even assuming it does this much,
there is a disquieting rumor that the Treasury will
again thwart the intention of Congress by adopting
a very narrow construction in its forthcoming pro­
posed regulations. In the meantime we are very much
at sea since the Service refuses to issue any rulings
on the vital questions. Under these circumstances,
things at the moment are almost as unsettled as they
were before passage of the amendment. Perhaps by
this time next year we will have some definite word
in the form of Regulations and will be able to make
our plans with confidence. We can only hope that
the Treasury will see the light and interpret the
Amendment reasonably so that we won't have to ask
Congress to amend the Amendment."
In view of the fact that I chose this excerpt only
as a sample, I am sure you will understand my omis­
sion of the author's name. I hope that he, too, will
be understanding.
Finally there is one other item concerning the 1967
Institute program which candor compels me to reveal.
On the opening day there is a dinner session. The
announcement of it, which is set in exceptionally bold
type, reads as follows: "This session is reserved ex­
clusively for entertainment; absolutely no speeches
of any kind will be permitted."
Emil Sandstrom of Sweden, President of the International
Association of Legal Science, and Andre Bertrand of France,
Secretarq-Cetieral of the Association, with Professor Soia
"AtentschikofJ.
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tiveness of sanctions against improper conduct once it
is disclosed.
I will not speculate on the sense of shame of those
involved in the serious abuses uncovered by the Com­
mittee, beyond saying that those disclosures do not
warrant any optimism. The inescapable danger under
the pending legislation is that disclosure regulation,
unaccompanied by effective sanctions agajnst im­
proprieties disclosed, would have no significant effect
on the conduct of thick-skinned and faithless fidu­
ciaries. Disclosure regulation which at best produces
confessions, without repentance, scarcely justifies the
heavy burdens which such regulation would impose
on honestly administered plans and on the govern­
ment.
The sanctions now applicable to maladministration
of the plans involved have, as the Subcommittee's
investigation has indicated, been inadequate in prac­
tice and may remain so. In this connection, it is im­
portant to note that notwithstanding the superficial
resemblance between the contemplated disclosure
legislation and the Securities Act of 1933, there is a
basic difference between them. In the securities field,
there is a drastic and well-known sanction supple­
menting the criminal provisions for false disclosure.
A stop order by the SEC will, in general, make the
securities unmarketable. No comparable sanction
exists for disclosure in the context of welfare and
pension plans. Furthermore, it seems clear that in
exercising its authority to issue stop orders, the SEC
considers not only the adequacy of disclosure but also
any overreaching or unfairness in a securities offering.
The SEC is thus in effect exercising a regulatory
authority, which would not be available to the enforc­
ing agency under the pending legislation.
It is possible, of course, that the contemplated dis­
closure requirements, coupled with effective federal­
state cooperation, might lead to more effective en­
forcement on the state level by state agencies as well
as by the beneficiaries of the plans. But the variety
of state regulatory systems and the substantial ob­
stacles to effective enforcement by beneficiaries which
would persist leaves this matter in considerable doubt.
The foregoing discussion suggests that (1) dis­
closure regulation, without direct and effective sanc­
tions against malfeasance by trustees (as distinguished
from sanctions for false reports) may be ineffective
in advancing the statutory purposes; and (2) there is,
accordingly, a serious question as to whether the con­
jectural benefits of such legislation justify the heavy
burdens involved. Alternative means of regulation,
which do not involve general disclosure requirements
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could, I believe, achieve the statutory objectives more
effectively and with significantly less cost to the gov­
ernment and the legitimate private interests involved.
The alternative regulation would incorporate the
following elements:
( 1) Criminal provisions against embezzlement of the assets
of a plan and against the following kinds of specified miscon­
duct, by any trustee, administrator, or employee of any plan or
by any employee or officer of any enterprise or organization
establishing a plan (all of whom are herein included in the
term "fiduciary");
( a) Receipt of any compensation, direct or indirect, from
any person or company, selling, directly or indirectly,
insurance or any other service to the plan involved or
to any other welfare or pension plan.
(b) Owning the securities of, or having a property in­
terest in (other than an interest resulting from the
issuance of personal insurance policies in the ordinary
course of business), or serving as an officer, em­
ployee, or member of the board of directors, of any
company, firm, person, agency, broker, selling insur­
ance or other services to the plan involved or to any
other welfare or pension plan. This provision should,
however, be so limited as to be inapplicable to banks,
trust companies, investment advisors, actuarial experts
and the like, which are not involved in the purchase
of insurance or other services for a plan but only
carry out investment functions or other functions
which do not involve any possibility of conflicting in­
terests in enterprises selling insurance or other serv­
ices to a plan. Furthermore, in order not to prohibit,
in appropriate cases, ownership of insurance com­
panies or of medical clinics, etc., by welfare and
pension funds, there should be a provision for admin­
istrative exemption from this restriction. Such an ex­
emption might, for example, be granted to the Amal­
gamated Clothing Workers of America with respect
to insurance companies owned by funds administered
by that union. (See p. 44 of Final Rept. of Sen. Com­
mittee on Labor and Public Welfare, Rept. No. 1734,
84th Congo 2d Sess. )
( c) Lending money to, or borrowing money from, a plan
of which he is a fiduciary.
( d) Selling property or assets of any kind, directly or in­
directly, to the plan unless the market value thereof
is independently established by transactions on an
organized securities exchange or the like and the price
to the plan is not in excess of the price so established.
( e) Purchasing property from the plan unless the market
value thereof is independently established (as above)
and unless the purchase price is at least as high as
the price so established.
(f) Receiving direct or indirect compensation from the
plan for services rendered to it if the fiduciary, dur­
ing the calendar year in which such services are
rendered, was employed by an employer or union
establishing, or contributing to the plan, or partici­
pating in its administration, or representing employees
who are beneficiaries of the plan, at an annual rate
of compensation in excess of $3,500.
( 2) Criminal sanctions against any person who is not a
"fiduciary," who knowingly participates in the violation of any
of the foregoing provisions by a fiduciary.
A portion of the French delegation at the Conference of the
International Association of Legal Science: Counsellor of State
Mere Ancel, Counsellor of State Andre Letourner, and Andre
Bertrand, Secretary-General of the Association.
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(3) The provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) above would
be enforceable by civil as well as criminal actions.
( 4) A provision that fiduciaries should be under a duty (a)
to administer the assets of the plan solely in the interests of its
beneficiaries and (b) to avoid any transactions in the name of,
or on behalf of, the plan, as a result of which, or in connection
with which a fiduciary benefits directly or indirectly, except
in his capacity as a beneficiary. This provision would be im­
plemented by civil actions exclusively.
(5) A provision that third persons knowingly participating
in a breach of the general duties imposed on fiduciaries by
par. 4 (above) would also be subject to civil actions for
damages.
(6) The enforcing agency would have authority by regula­
tion to provide that specified classes of transactions would be
subject to either criminal provisions or to the civil fiduciary
standards. Such regulations prior to their promulgation would
be filed with Congress while in session and would become
effective only if neither House registered its dissent within a
specified period.
( 7) Both the enforcing agency and the beneficiaries would
have a right to bring the civil actions provided for and to
intervene in actions brought by the other. The enforcing
agency, prior to instituting civil actions would give notice of
its intention to do so, so as to permit the beneficiaries, within
a specified waiting period to institute the action. Beneficiaries
who established a serious breach by a fiduciary in actions
which they filed or made a substantial contribution as inter­
venors in government-instituted actions would, in the court's
discretion, be entitled to a reasonable counsel's fee. A judg­
ment on the merits in a federal court would be bar to an action
on the same transaction in a state court and vice versa. In
order to prevent collusive actions, provision should be made for
this bar to operate only if the enforcing agency was given pre­
scribed notice as to filing of actions by private individuals so
that the agency, in appropriate cases, could intervene. (If vio­
lations of the statute should occur in connection with level-of­
benefit plans, there would be problems as to who would be
entitled to the resulting damages. The employer-entity would
generally seem entitled to the damages where such violations
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increased his net cost for the agreed-upon benefits. Neverthe­
less, in some cases, those owning all or the controlling interest
in the employer-entity might be responsible for the abuse which
may have been prompted by a desire to inflate the costs of the
plan. In such a situation, recovery of full damages by the
entity would seem anomalous. It is difficult to deal specifically
with the variety of circumstances which may arise. Accord­
ingly, the court should in its discretion be authorized to grant
all or part of the damages to the employer, to the employees,
or to the government, and should be directed to allocate dam­
ages so as to promote the statutory objectives.)
( 8) The enforcing agency should be authorized to prescribe
by regulations the content, auditing and the form of the ac­
counts and records, etc., of the plans as well as the period
which the accounts and records should be kept. Violations of
such regulations should be made a crime.
(9) The statute should also provide:
( a) For periodic reports to the beneficiaries showing the
total contribution made by the employer and the
employees, respectively, and the benefits available or
accrued under the plan.
(b) For authority in the enforcing agency to prescribe the
form and content, including information in addition
to that provided for in (a) (above), of such reports.
( c) That such reports to the employees should advise
them of the name and address of the enforcing
agency and should indicate that information as to im­
proper conduct or as to inadequate disclosure in con-
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nection with the administration of the plan should
be sent to the agency.
( d) That a duly verified copy of such reports be filed and
preserved by the custodian of the books and records
of a plan, in accordance with the regulations of the
enforcing agency.
(e) That wilful falsification in such reports, or wilful fail­
ure to make them, or wilful omissions therefrom con­
stitute a crime.
(f) That designated persons (clearly described in the
statute or by administrative regulation) shall be under
a duty to make such reports to the beneficiaries. (This
provision should, I believe, impose this duty on offi­
cers of employers in connection with plans established
and administered solely by employers, on trustees of
jointly-administered plans, and on union officers in
connection with plans established and administered
solely by unions. This provision should not require
organizations such as banks and trust companies ren­
dering services to plans to report directly to bene­
ficiaries but should require such organizations to
certify the data within their possession necessary for
such reports. (Compare S 1122, Sec. 6 (a) and 6 ( d)
of S 1122.)
(10) The agency should be authorized, in its discretion, to
require plans to furnish the information described in Section 6
of S 1122, to subpoena their books or to inspect their books at
reasonable times and should be given similar subpoena and
inspection authority with respect to the books of any person
which are relevant to the administration of any plan.
The foregoing proposals are a tentative framework
which could be vastly improved by the informed
criticism of the Committee's staff and others. Con­
sideration of these proposals by the Committee is, I
believe, warranted because, as already indicated, they
appear to have the following advantages over pending
bills relying largely on general disclosure require­
ments.
( 1) The alternative proposals would avoid the analytical
and practical problems involved in carving out exemptions from
disclosure regulation.
(2) They would avoid the great burdens which general dis­
closure requirements would impose on both the government
and on honestly administered plans unless exemptions from
such requirements could be devised for honestly administered
plans in any class of plans, which seems unlikely.
( 3) They would directly prohibit, and impose appropriate
sanctions on, improper conduct; this promises to be more effec­
tive than the indirect requirement of disclosure, which is a
doubtful method of deterring fiduciary abuses in this area.
( 4) They would authorize administrative requirements for
proper record-keeping, thereby facilitating proof of impropriety.
( 5) They would permit the enforcing agency to be selective
in its demands for comprehensive disclosure, thereby conserv­
ing its resources for situations which warrant scrutiny.
(6) They would encourage beneficiaries to enforce the fidu­
ciary duties owed to them and would, at the same time, avoid
the. dangers arising from the concentration of enforcement in
a single agency or group.
The foregoing proposal for the elimination of gen­
eral, as opposed to selective, disclosure requirements
involves judgments on difficult questions of degree.
Accordingly, before I conclude this memorandum, it
seems desirable to refer to considerations qualifying
the position developed above.
General disclosure requirements would, of course,
make some contribution to the legislative purposes,
a contribution which would be increased if automatic
disclosure to the government was part of a balanced
program which included effectively implemented fidu­
ciary standards. But this conclusion does not answer
the underlying question, which is whether the return
from disclosure regulation would justify both the re­
sultant burdens and the logical and practical prob­
lems raised by an attempt to reduce such burdens
by means of the various exemptions contemplated by
the pending regulations. Although I have expressed
my doubts about the adequacy of the return I recog­
nize the difficulty of making firm judgments about
the impact of disclosure requirements. Similarly there
is no formula for determining the wisdom of the costs
of enforcing a legislative program even when such
costs can be reliably estimated, which is not the case
here. Finally, as to the exemption problem, statutory
exemptions are usually crude and imperfect qualifica­
tions on the legislative purposes, and exemptions
which cannot neatly be supported on logical grounds
often result from the practical need to reduce both
the government's enforcement burden and the cost
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of compliance by especially appealing interests, such
as «small business." Such necessarily practical and
imperfect accommodation of conflicting 0b j e c tiv e s
may be inescapable in connection with pension and
welfare legislation.
The foregoing considerations, which weaken the ob­
jections to the disclosure and exemption features of
the pending bills, are re-enforced by the large stakes
involved in welfare and pension plans and the com­
parative helplessness of beneficiaries to protect their
own interests.
However the issues as to general disclosure require­
ments and exemptions are resolved, it bears repetition
that it seems unlikely that the regulatory burdens of
such disclosure requirements would be justified unless
they are coupled with an effectively implemented
code of fiduciary conduct. Such a code appears to be
an indispensable prerequisite for effective legislation.
Furthermore, as my testimony indicated, the reasons
for exemptions from disclosure requirements do not
operate to justify exemptions from such a code; on
the contrary, disclosure exemption increases the need
for the applicability of fiduciary standards. Accord­
ingly, I renew my recommendation that such stand­
ards should be made applicable to all plans, and
especially to those plans which are exempted from
general disclosure requirements.
Respectfully submitted,
BERNARD D. MELTZEH.
At the Luncheon Session of the Labor Conjerence, left to
right, Professor Archibald Cox, of Harvard Law School, Robert
Tieken, JD'32, U. S. Attorney, Northern District of Illinois,
Gerard Reilly, of Washington, and Justice Walter Schaejer,
JD'28, of the Illinois Supreme Court.
Book Review
The Administration of Technical Assistance-Growth
in the Americas. By Philip M. Glick. The University
of Chicago Press. 390 pgs. $5.50
Reviewed by Elmer Gertz
This is one of a series of books on technical coopera­
tion in Latin America, sponsored by The National
Planning Association. It is the first complete story of
the organization and management of the technical
assistance programs South of the Rio Grande, written
by the former general counsel of the Institute of
Inter-American Affairs and of the Technical Co-opera­
tion Administration and one of the drafters of the
immortal Point Four Program. It is likely to become
a classic in its special but increasingly important field.
During the more than thirty years that I have
known Philip M. Glick, I have always been impressed
by his earnestness, understanding and integrity, and
the sort of subdued brilliance and quiet drive of the
man. He was one of a group of classmates at the Uni­
versity, all personal friends, who rose to the manifold
Governmental opportunities under the New Deal in
its first aureoled days. They were all, and none more
so than Mr. Glick, highly articulate, social minded and
dedicated men, who helped give tone and meaning
to the new administration. There was nothing blase
nor passive in their temperaments. They welcomed
public service because of the larger opportunities it
offered for men of vision. Each one was capable of
filling remunerative posts in private business, but they
In deep conversation immediately after the groundbreaking,
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